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Litigating a Novel Course and Scope of
Employment Issue: INA of Texas v. Bryant
J. Thomas Sullivan*
The case of INA of Texas v. Bryant 1 illustrates two common
problems that may concern litigants in personal injury actions:
(1) the tactical choice between pursuing recovery under the
Texas Workers' Compensation Act2 (the "Act") and prosecuting
the claim in negligence, and (2) the ambivalent role of the depo-
sition as a discovery tool and as a source of substantive evidence.
This article traces the litigation strategies used by counsel for the
plaintiff employee and the defendant insurance carrier in Bryant,
through the trial and appellate court proceedings, in order to
demonstrate the uncertain interplay between the state of the rec-
ord made at trial and the ultimate disposition of a case of first
impression.
The decision to seek benefits under the Act
Bryant worked as a temporary employee of the Collin Street
Bakery in Corsicana (the "Bakery").- Her employment was ter-
minated when the shift on which she worked was discontinued
by the employer.4 Subsequently, she went to the employer's
premises to pick up her final paycheck and was injured in a fall on
the stairway leading to the firm's second floor offices. 5 Bryant
was unable to assist in developing any witnesses to the incident
who could have testified as to the circumstances of her accident,
or helped to establish negligence on the part of the employer.6
* B.A. 1972, University of Texas; J.D. 1976, Southern Methodist University;
L.L.M. 1982, University of Texas. Mr. Sullivan is an attorney in Dallas, Texas.
1. 686 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. 1985) (aff'g 673 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. App.-Waco 1984)).
2. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 8306-8309f (Vernon 1967).
3. 673 S.W.2d at 693.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 694.
6. Interview with trial counsel, Paul W. Pearson, Attorney at Law. But Bryant
could still have pursued a claim in negligence, relying on her testimony concerning her
fall and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor. See also Mobil Chemical Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d
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For meritorious claimants, there are two chief virtues of pur-
suing recovery under the Act: it dispenses with the need to prove
negligence, 7 and it abolishes the common law defenses of con-
tributory negligence, fellow servant negligence, and assumption
of risk, which traditionally defeated claims by injured workers.,
These advantages were significant to counsel's decision in Bryant
to pursue a workers' compensation action, even absent prior
Texas decisions interpreting the "course and scope of employ-
ment" 9 concept under the Act to include injuries sustained after
the employee's termination. Since Bryant was unable to produce
testimony other than her own to establish negligence on the part
of her employer, the jury could have concluded that the fall was
the result of pure accident or Bryant's own negligence, rather
than the fault of her employer.' 0 On the other hand, because the
fall itself was undisputed, Bryant could sustain her burden in a
workers' compensation action based solely on her own testi-
mony 1 and that of the physician who subsequently examined
245, 251 (Tex. 1974); 3 STATE BAR OF TEXAs, TEXAS PATrERN JURY CHARGES, PJC 61.01
(1982).
7. The burden of proof in a simple workers' compensation action requires the
claimant to establish that (1) she was an "employee" at the time of the accident; (2) that
she was "engaged in or about the furtherance of her employer's affairs or business"; and
(3) that her injury was of a "kind and character that had to do with and originated in the
employer's work, trade, business, or profession." Deatherage v. International Ins. Co.,
615 S.W.2d 181, 182 (Tex. 1981).
8. Art. 8306, § 1 (Vernon 1967).
9. See 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES, PJC 21.10 (1970)
which defines course and scope of employment: "Injury in the course of employment"
means any injury having to do with and originating in the work, business, trade, or pro-
fession of the employer, received by an employee while engaged in or about the further-
ance of the affairs or business of the employer, whether upon the employer's premises
or elsewhere.
10. Negligence requires proof of a breach of a legal duty resulting in injury. Thus,
the claimant would have had to show the employer's negligence in failing to discover a
dangerous condition on the premises, in failing to correct the dangerous condition, or in
failing to adequately warn about the dangerous condition. See Adam Dante Corp. v.
Sharpe, 483 S.W.2d 452, 455 (Tex. 1972). Otherwise, the claimant's contributory negli-
gence in failing to appreciate an obvious danger or keep a proper lookout for dangerous
conditions could have resulted in no recovery. Montes v. Lazzara Shipyard, 657 S.W.2d
886, 889 (rex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ) (plaintiff's failure to keep proper
lookout was cause of injury where he was injured using a defective ladder); Friedan v.
Pan -Tex Hotel Corp., 652 S.W.2d 365, 366-67 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ)
(plaintiff's own negligence constituted 607o of total negligence causing injury).
11. The claimant's testimony alone can be sufficient to establish the fact of injury,
not requiring corroborative evidence. In fact, wholly circumstantial evidence may even
be sufficient where the claimant is dead or unable to testify. See Sullivan, Unexplained
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her,12 if the jury were to find that the injury was sustained while
acting within the course and scope of her employment.' 3
By electing to seek recovery under the Act, counsel for the
plaintiff employee in Bryant avoided the difficult factual problems
the case would have presented as a negligence cause of action,' 4
and instead confronted Texas courts with the novel legal issue of
whether an employee who suffers an injury subsequent to his ter-
mination comes within the statutory meaning of "course and
scope" of employment.
The state of the case law prior to Bryant
The defendant insurance carrier in Bryant relied on Ellison v.
Trailite, Inc. 15 to support its argument that Bryant could not re-
cover under the Act for an injury occurring after the employer
had terminated her employment.' 6 In Ellison, the plaintiff em-
ployee was injured by another employee on firm premises in an
assault occurring after the plaintiff's termination. The defendant
employer sought to establish the Act as the exclusive. basis for
recovery, in response to the plaintiff's claim for damages based
on the doctrine of respondeat superior.' 7 The court of appeals
rejected the employer's argument and concluded that the em-
ployment relationship ceased when the employment was termi-
nated. Furthermore, the Act could not be construed to govern a
claim arising out of a dispute which followed termination of
employment.' 8
Accidents and Assaults: The Problems and Burdens of Proof Under the Texas Workers Compensation
Statute, 16 TEx. TEcH L. REv. 875 (1985).
12. Testimony of a medical expert is generally critical for establishing the extent of
disability resulting from an injury. See Blair v. INA of Texas, 686 S.W.2d 627, 628-29
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). However, in her deposition, Bryant
admitted that her treating physician told her he was unable to diagnose any organic
basis for her pain.
13. Deatherage v. International Ins. Co., 615 S.W.2d 181, 182 (Tex. 1981).
14. See infra p. 305.
15. 580 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
16. The carrier argued two theories: first, that plaintiff was not an "employee" on
the date of her injury because she had already been terminated from her employment
with the Bakery; and second, that the injury itself did not occur within the course and
scope of plaintiff's employment, even assuming she could meet the threshold require-
ment of establishing that she was an "employee" at the time of the accident. Brief in
Support of Defendant's Motion for SummaryJudgment at 3-5, Bryant, No. 336-83 (Dist.
Ct. of Navarro County, 13th Judicial Dist. of Texas).
17. 580 S.W.2d at 615.
18. "We hold that once employment is terminated by resignation or by the em-
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Bryant relied on Texas General Indemnity Co. v. Luce, 19 a work-
ers' compensation decision, in her appeal from the trial court's
grant of the defendant's summary judgment motion. The em-
ployee in Luce had not been terminated prior to her injury, but
had been on vacation. She returned to the employer's premises,
at the employer's direction,2 ° to pick up her paycheck. While on
the employer's premises, she stopped to talk with fellow employ-
ees at the cafeteria and was injured.2 1
Neither Ellison nor Luce were clearly dispositive of Bryant's
claim. The plaintiff in Ellison had not brought his cause of action
under the Act, while the employee in Luce had not been termi-
nated prior to returning to her employer's premises to pick up
her check. Furthermore, the general rule of Royalty Indemnity Co.
v. Madrigal,22 which the Waco Court of Appeals relied on to re-
verse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in Bryant, 23 did
not address the issue directly. The Madrigal court concluded:
[A] workman who has ceased his work for the day and is on his
way to the office of his employer to obtain his pay, or after ob-
taining such pay is leaving the premises of his employer and is
injured on the premises of his employer, will be held entitled to
compensation.
Madrigal, however, did not address the case of a terminated em-
ployee injured on the employer's premises while picking up a
paycheck.
Despite the absence of controlling Texas decisions, Bryant
was able to rely on a substantial body of case law from otherju-
ployee's being fired, no injury thereafter incurred is received within the course of his
employment, for purposes of workmen's compensation law." Id.
19. 491 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
20. Id. at 768.
21. The court rejected the argument that the employee's act in stopping to talk with
her co-workers constituted a deviation from the course and scope of employment so as
to preclude coverage. Instead, the court concluded:
The law must be reasonable. Employer here-admittedly for its benefit-re-
quired employee to physically draw her pay at the place of business, even dur-
ing a vacation period. In so requiring, employer and this court must expect
employee to exchange greetings with co-workers as she entered or left. We are
unable to apply the principle of deviation from employment so rigidly as to
ignore the common habits of most people.
Id.
22. 14 S.W.2d 106 (rex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1929, no writ).
23. 673 S.W.2d at 696.
24. 14 S.W.2d at 108. The Luce court noted that the statement by the Madrigal court
"has never been challenged (or cited either, for that matter) .. " 491 S.W.2d at 768.
[Vol. 5:297300
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risdictions.25 Most of these decisions reflected the general prin-
ciple that termination of the employment relationship does not
foreclose recovery where employees suffer injuries while en-
gaged in activities concluding their employment. In Parrott v. In-
dustrial Commission of Ohio,2 6 for example, the employee was
injured while picking up his paycheck after having been termi-
nated and having missed the regular payday. 27 The court rea-
soned that payment for work performed was integral to the
employment relationship, 28 and thus held that the employee was
entitled to benefits for an injury sustained while obtaining his fi-
nal paycheck. 29 Similarly, in Solo Cup Co. v. Pate,30 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court ruled that statutory benefits were available to an
employee injured in the process of returning her uniform to the
employer and picking up her final paycheck. Bryant's appellate
counsel was also able to rely on Professor Larson's general ob-
servation concerning the employment relationship:
The contract of employment is not fully terminated until the
employee is paid, and accordingly an employee is in the course
25. See generally IA A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 26.00-
26.40 (1984) (and cases cited therein) [hereinafter LARSON].
26. 145 Ohio St. 66, 60 N.E.2d 660 (1945).
27. Id. at 66-68, 60 N.E.2d 661.
28. The court observed:
It is the well-established custom.. .that the employee shall go to the office of
the employer for his pay on or after regular payday fixed by the employer. The
contract of employment, as to the matter of wages and their payment, is not
fully terminated or satisfied until the workman's wages, already earned, are
paid. It was not only the right but the duty of plaintiff to go to the coffin com-
pany plant and obtain his wages.
Id. at 71, 60 N.E.2d 663.
29. Id. (relying on Crane Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 306 Ill. 56, 137 N.E. 437
(1922)).
30. 528 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1974) (looking to the benefit conferred upon the employer
in having the employee return to deliver uniforms and pick up her final paycheck). The
Oklahoma court observed that had the injury occurred while the employee was on the
premises after termination to pick up personal tools, recovery would have been denied
since this act would have only benefited the employee and not the employer (citing
Parten v. State Indus. Court of State of Okla., 496 P.2d 114 (Okla. 1972); accord Peder-
son & Voechting v. Industrial Comm'n of Wis., 201 Wis. 599, 231 N.W. 267, 268 (1930);
see also Johnson v. City of Albia, 203 Iowa 1171, 212 N.W. 419, 422 (1927) (holding that
engineer returning to work to pick up tools after terminating employment was not enti-
tled to recovery in absence of showing that it was customary in the trade to do so in
completion of the performance of duties). Cf. Mitchell v. Consolidated Coal Co., 195
Iowa 415, 192 N.W. 145 (1923) (miner injured while picking up tools in the course of
quitting his job was entitled to compensation where evidence showed it was customary
for miner to finish certain work prior to removing tools from job site after terminating
employment).
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of employment while collecting his pay."'
Finally, Bryant could rely on decisions of the Arizona and
Wisconsin Supreme Courts in Peter Kiewit Sons Co. v. Industrial
Commission3 2 and Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Co. v. Indus-
trial Commission,3 respectively, in support of her position. In the
Arizona case, the employee was assaulted and injured while wait-
ing, at the direction of his foreman, to pick up his paycheck. In
the Wisconsin case, a discharged employee was accidentally in-
jured when he returned to the employer's premises to pick up his
tools and final paycheck3 4
The defendant to Bryant's action moved for summary judg-
ment, advancing two theories in support of its motion. Relying
on Ellison, the carrier argued that Bryant's termination precluded
recovery under the Act since her injury occurred subsequent to
her termination. In addition, the carrier offered the affidavit of
the Bakery's bookkeeper to establish that the policy of the em-
ployer was to mail checks to employees upon their request.35
The bookkeeper stated that to her knowledge no employee of the
Bakery had ever advised Bryant that she would be required to
return to the premises to personally pick up her final paycheck.3 6
In its motion for summary judgment, however, counsel for the
carrier expressly asked the trial court to consider Bryant's depo-
sition, which was taken and filed in the trial court prior to the
hearing.3 7 The order granting summary judgment recited that
the trial court had considered the deposition in reaching its deci-
31. Lu RSON, supra note 25, § 26.30.
32. 88 Ariz. 164, 354 P.2d 28 (1960).
33. 8 Wis.2d 606, 99 N.W.2d 809 (1959).
34. The primary issue in the case was, however, whether the employee was intoxi-
cated when he returned to pick up his check and, if so, whether his injury resulted from
his intoxication. Under the statute this circumstance would have reduced the claimant's
recovery by 1576. Id. at 608, 99 N.W.2d at 811.
35. The affidavit stated:
If Lawana Bryant had requested that her check be mailed to her, I would have
done so, as it was the policy of the Collin Street Bakery to allow the employees
who had been terminated to pick up the checks personally or have them mailed.
To my knowlege, no employee or representative of the Collin Street Bakery
ever instructed Lawana Bryant that she was required to pick up her final
paycheck in person.
673 S.W.2d at 694 (court of appeals opinion).
36. Id.
37. Defendant's Motion for SummaryJudgment at 1, Bryant, No. 336-83 (Dist. Ct. of
Navarro County, 13th Judicial Dist. of Texas).
[Vol. 5:297
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sion.3 8 The court of appeals seized upon the trial court's reliance
on Bryant's deposition to conclude that her testimony directly
refuted the bookkeeper's affidavit.39 The court then quoted di-
rectly from portions of Bryant's deposition to support its conclu-
sion that the bookkeeper's affidavit failed to establish that Bryant
had been told that her check would be mailed to her.40
The relevant portions of Bryant's testimony demonstrate the
problems posed by the use of the deposition as a discovery tool4 1
when portions of it are later extracted for substantive use:
42
Q (by INA's trial counsel) Nobody at the bakery ever told
you that you had to come back and pick up your check, did they?
A: They said we had to come back in two weeks.
Q. But they told you you could get your check in two weeks,
isn't that right?
A: Uh-huh.
Q. But they didn't tell you you had to come back to get it,
did they?
A: They said we had to come and get them, to get the
checks.
Q. Do you remember if someone told you specifically that
they could send it to you?
A: They didn't say that.
Q. Do you remember-
A: Uh-huh, to come get them.
Q. Do you remember who told you that?
A: Huh-uh.
Q. You didn't talk to-
A: I didn't talk to them. My husband did, so, I don't know.
Q. So nobody told you that you had to go back to the bakery
to get your check, right?
38. See 673 S.W.2d at 694, where the court of appeals expressly noted the language
of the order in rejecting INA's contention "that the deposition is not properly a part of
the summary judgment evidence."
39. 673 S.W.2d at 694.
40. Id.
41. For an early analysis of the perceived limitations on the use of the deposition as
a discovery tool posed by the court of appeals opinion in Bryant, see Note, Bryant v. INA of
Texas: A New Splinter from an Old Log, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 277, 287-88 (1985).
42. TEX. R. Civ. P. 207 provides for use of deposition testimony as substantive testi-
monial evidence at trial. See also TEx. R. EVID. 801(e)(1)(a) and 804(b)(1) (governing
exclusion of deposition testimony from general rules against admission of hearsay).
1986]
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A: That's right. Just my husband.
Q. So, if you understood that, it was only because of what
someone told your husband.
A: Uh-huh. He was the foreman or whatever he was, you
know. He was the foreman-I guess that's what he was.43
The court noted that much of Bryant's testimony would have
been subject to objection as hearsay,44 but that no objections had
been made.45 Relying on the newly adopted evidence code,46 the
court concluded that the hearsay was probative in the absence of
a timely objection.47 Bryant's testimony that she relied on the
instructions of the bakery foreman in returning to pick up her
final paycheck was deemed sufficient to raise a fact issue regard-
ing the course and scope question, thus requiring reversal of the
grant of summary judgment. 4
The court held that when an employer instructs a terminated
employee to return to the premises to pick up his final paycheck,
the employee's compliance with this instruction is within the
course and scope of her employment. 49 The court thus con-
cluded that the deposition testimony raised an issue of fact re-
garding the employee's understanding of her employer's
instruction-which could not be disregarded in deciding the
43. 673 S.W.2d at 694-95 (quoting from deposition of claimant).
44. Id at 695. Arguably, of course, many of the statements made by Bryant which
might have been subject to objection on hearsay grounds would have been admissible as
admission made by a party opponent under TEx. R. EVID. 801(e)(2), which provides that
a statement is not hearsay ifi
(2) The statement is offered against a party and is.. .(D) a statement made by
his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or em-
ployment, made during the existence of the relationship .... Thus, Bryant's
recollection of statements made by her foreman, or even by her husband, who
was also an employee, relating to her employer's instructions, would not have
been hearsay under the new evidence code.
45. Id At the time of taking the deposition both counsel reserved substantive objec-
tions for trial, pursuant to TEx. R. Crv. P. 204(4) as amended, effective April 1, 1984.
46. TEx. R. EvID. 802 which provides, in pertinent part: "Inadmissible hearsay ad-
mitted without objection shall not be denied probative value merely because it is
hearsay."
47. The court stated:
Since the deposition was considered by the court and no objection was filed to
the hearsay contained in it, we consider as probative appellant's testimony that
she relied on the instruction of a bakery foreman in returning to the bakery
some fifteen days after she was discharged to pick up her final paycheck.
673 S.W.2d at 695.
48. "[T]he summary judgment evidence conflicted as to whether appellant was in-
structed to return to the bakery to pick up her last paycheck." Id.
49. Id.
[Vol. 5:297
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summary judgment motion.5 °
In its Motion for Rehearing and Application for Writ of Error,
the carrier complained of the court's reliance on hearsay to re-
verse the order for summary judgment.5 The Texas Supreme
Court did not address the issue directly; instead, it found that
portions of Bryant's deposition testimony, other than testimony
which arguably could have been excluded as hearsay at the
trial,52 independently demonstrated a fact issue.
The supreme court's disposition leaves open a significant is-
sue for summary judgment practice: whether hearsay developed
through discovery prior to the hearing can raise an unresolved
fact issue requiring denial of a motion for summary judgment.
50. Id at 696 (relying on City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d
671, 678 (rex. 1979), which held summary judgment proper only if movant establishes
that no material fact issue exists in the case and that he is entitled to summary judgment
as a matter of law).
51. Appellee's Motion for Rehearing, Bryant v. INA of Tex., 673 S.W.2d 693 (Tex.
App.-Waco 1984)(No. 10-84-019CV) (Points of Error 1, 2, and 3). In Point of Error 2,
INA objected that Bryant's deposition testimony was not based on "personal knowl-
edge" as required by TEx. R. Crv. P. 166-A(e). However, the rule speaks to affidavits
offered in support of opposing summary judgment, rather than deposition testimony with
regard to the "personal knowledge" requirement. The distinction is critical since affida-
vits cannot, by their nature, be tested by cross-examination conducted with the witness
under oath.
Point of Error 3 objected to the court's reliance on hearsay in the Bryant deposition
not because it was hearsay, but because the testimony "was never raised at the trial court
level and, therefore, objections to same would not have been proper." Appellee's Mo-
tion for Rehearing at 10, Bryant, No. 336-83 (Dist. Ct. of Navarro County, l3thJudicial
Dist. of Texas). The trial court's order granting summary judgment recited, however,
that "the deposition on file" was considered by the court. Order, Bryant, id. Both coun-
sel approved this Order as to form.
In INA's conclusion in Petitioner's Application for Writ of Error, the carrier argued
both that Bryant could not recover as a matter of compensation for an injury sustained
following her termination and that the court of appeals erred in relying on her deposi-
tion testimony in finding an unresolved fact issue. Petitioner's Application for Writ of
Error at 21-22, Bryant, 686 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. 1985)(No. C-3430). With regard to the
latter, INA vigorously asserted:
The only summary judgment evidence the court of appeals relies on to find an
issue of fact is deposition testimony of the Plaintiff which was never cited or
relied upon by the Plaintiff at the trial court level. Not only was this evidence
not raised and properly presented to the trial court to preserve the right to rely
upon same at the appellate level, but same is inadmissible evidence and, there-
fore, is not proper to create an issue of fact. Moreover, it would be ludicrous
and violative of due process, and all that is fair and just to require a movant for
summary judgment to object to all evidence which could be raised by a Respon-
dent on the basis of its inadmissibility, when same has not even be (sic) cited or
relied upon by the Respondent.
Id.
52. Id. at 615.
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Clearly, the change in the rules of evidence53 is sufficient to sug-
gest that trial counsel must guard against affirmatively relying5 4
on a deposition where disputed facts may be inferred from hear-
say statements contained in the testimony. As a discovery tool, of
course, the deposition may prove far less valuable if counsel is
forced to avoid probing the mind of the witness to establish just
such a basis for belief or action as the claimant provided in
Bryant.55
In order to avoid complication of the summary judgment pro-
cess with statements arguably subject to exclusion at trial, coun-
sel for the movant should preserve an objection in the motion for
summary judgment, or otherwise advise the trial court of the
existence of the objectionable testimony or evidence in the rec-
ord. In Bryant, trial counsel not only failed to voice any objection
to consideration of hearsay statements contained in the deposi-
tion,56 but expressly requested the court to consider the deposi-
tion in ruling on the summary judgment motion. Defense
counsel also could have avoided the problem posed by the depo-
sition testimony simply by waiting to schedule examination of the
claimant until after the summary judgment motion had been
granted or denied: defense counsel already had available
through the client the evidence that the employee had been ter-
minated prior to her injury and, thus, did not need to rely on the
claimant's deposition in the summary judgment motion. Since
53. The adoption of the new evidence code, and specifically, Rule 802, has substan-
tively altered Texas' view on the probative value which may be accorded to unobjected
hearsay. See Note, supra note 41, at 279-82, and notes accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the pre-Rule 802 rule that hearsay evidence was without probative value.
54. Clearly, Rule 166-A contemplates that deposition testimony may be relied on in
support or in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.
55. Counsel agreed prior to taking the deposition "that any and all objections to any
question or answer herein may be made upon the offering of this deposition in evidence
upon the trial of this cause with the same fdrce and effect as though the witness were
present in person and testifying from the witness stand." Deposition of Lawana Bryant
at 4, Bryant, No. 336-83 (Dist. Ct. of Navarro County, 13th judicial Dist. of Texas). See
TEx. R. Crv. P. 204(4). One problem posed by Bryant is that even though the supreme
court did not rely on the "hearsay statements" contained in the Bryant deposition, it did
expressly rely on other evidence in the deposition to support its favorable holding for
the claimant; thus, it is not the hearsay question which plagues the insurer in BrYant, but
rather the existence of the deposition at all. 686 S.W.2d at 615.
56. The court of appeals noted: "Since the deposition was considered by the court
and no objection wasfiLed to the hearsay contained in it .... 673 S.W.2d at 695.
57. INA's Motion for Summary judgment at I, Bryant, No. 336-83 (Dist. Ct. of
Navarro County, 13th judicial Dist. of Texas).
[Vol. 5:297
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Rule 20658 mandates filing of the deposition by the officer after it
is prepared, counsel could not in good faith have requested a
delay in filing to avoid having made the record available to the
trial court. However, had the deposition simply been deferred
until after resolution of the motion, the evidence relied on by the
appellate courts in Bryant would not have been available to sup-
port the decisions holding the grant of summary judgment im-
proper. Of course, INA might still have suffered reversal because
of the equivocal nature of the bookkeeper's affidavit regarding
whether it was the employer or employee who elected to have the
final paycheck mailed.5 9 In any event, the existence of Bryant's
testimony served to sharply question the effect which could be
accorded to the bookkeeper's statement regarding the em-
ployer's practice of mailing checks to terminated employees.6 °
Had INA's reliance on Ellison6 proved to be correct, the
question of the employer's instruction, or lack thereof should
have been immaterial to the disposition of the case. However, as
the opinions of the court of appeals 62 and of the majority63 and
dissenting judges6 of the supreme court show, the issue became
critical to the disposition of the case since both courts declined to
apply either an absolute rule of coverage or an absolute rule pre-
cluding coverage. Ultimately, decision of the case turned on the
evidence available to assess whether or not the employee reason-
ably believed she had to return to the employer's premises to
pick up her final check.65
58. TEx. R. Civ. P. 206(1) provides the officer taking the deposition "shall promptly
file it with the court in which the action is pending or send it by registered or certified
mail to the clerk thereof for filing" after it is prepared and certified.
59. The Texas Supreme Court majority opinion noted "the failure of INA to estab-
lish that Bryant was informed of her choice as to the method of payment .. " 686
S.W.2d at 615.
60. Id. See supra note 35 for relevant text of the bookkeeper's affidavit.
61. Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Bryant, No.
336-83 (Dist. Ct. of Navarro County, 13th Judicial Dist. of Texas).
62. 673 S.W.2d at 696.
63. 686 S.W.2d at 615. The majority opinion authored byJustice Gonzalez neither
cited nor discussed the holding in Ellison.
64. 686 S.W.2d at 615-16. Justice Spears did not cite or discuss Ellison.
65. The majority of the supreme court held:
Bryant states that her husband had worked in the past at the bakery and that he
had always returned to the plant to pick up his pay. This fact coupled with the
failure of INA to establish that Bryant was informed of her choice as to the
method of payment, raises a material issue of fact as to whether the practice of
the bakery required Bryant to return in order to receive her final paycheck.
19861
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The decisions of the appellate courts
The appellate courts could have applied one of four rules
available in suits to recover injuries sustained by an employee af-
ter termination of the employment relationship.
1. The courts could have applied a rule of absolute non-cov-
erage for an injury sustained after the employee's termination. 66
Such a rule probably would have required an exception for inju-
ries sustained during the employee's immediate exit from the
employer's premises, or sustained during the remainder of any
workday or period of actual employment. 67 Otherwise, this ap-
proach would have required that any claim for an injury subse-
quently sustained on the premises or in conjunction with the
prior duties of employment be based on negligence or some
other tort theory. This approach most closely resembles the rea-
soning of Ellison and the argument advanced by INA in the court
of appeals.68
2. Recovery could have been authorized upon an affirmative
showing by the employee that the injury was a consequence of
686 S.W.2d at 615 (emphasis in original).
66. Pederson & Voechting v. Industrial Comm'n of Wis., 201 Wis. 599, 604, 231
N.W. 267, 269 (1930) (holding injury sustained by employee returning to premises to
remove work clothes and tools not compensable). Cf. Massachusetts Bonding and Ins.
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 8 Wis.2d 606, 99 N.W.2d 809 (1959), in which the Wisconsin
court held a similar injury compensable without expressly overruling or modifying Peder-
son. Worth noting is the fact that the discharged employee in Pederson had already re-
ceived his final paycheck and was only involved in getting personal items when the injury
occurred, whereas in Massachusetts Bonding the employee was injured while returning for
his tools and final paycheck.
67. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Consolidated Coal Co., 528 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1974) (miner
injured while picking up his tools while in the course of quitting his job suffered com-
pensable injury since custom of trade required employee to complete day's work after
being terminated).
68. 673 S.W.2d at 695-96. In Appellee's Motion for Rehearing to the court of ap-
peals, Bryant, 673 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. App.-Waco 1984) (No. 10-84-019CV), appellee
relied on Lesco Transp. Co. v. Campbell, 500 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1973, no writ) in addition to Eison. In Lesco, however, recovery was denied not because
the employee had been terminated prior to sustaining injury, but because he had devi-
ated from the duties of his employment when he was hurt. Lesco stands generally for the
proposition that an employee is not covered for every conceivable injury which may
occur while he is employed, even if it occurs while he is engaged in work activities on his
employer's premises. The injury must originate in the actual duties of the worker's em-
ployment. In Lesco, the court rejected the argument that the employee's activity was so
logically related to his work that the resulting injury was necessarily covered. Instead,
the court essentially held that he undertook to assume maintenance duties which did not
further his employer's interests.
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the employer's direct instructions to return to the premises.69
This rule would have permitted employers virtually to escape any
liability under the Act simply by directing all terminated employ-
ees not to return for their final paychecks in person, but to wait
to receive them in the mail. Such a rule would place a heavy bur-
den on a terminated employee so advised to prove that he had a
reasonable basis for believing that he should attempt to obtain
the final paycheck in person. 70 Interestingly, this approach is re-
flected in the opinion rendered by the court of appeals 71 and in
the dissenting opinion by Justice Spears,72 joined by Justice
Campbell. The court of appeals concluded:
... the summary judgment evidence conflicted as to whether
appellant was instructed to return to the bakery to pick up her
last paycheck. This conflict becomes material if the instruction
to return has the effect of putting an employee in the course
and scope of his employment when he returns upon that in-
struction to pick up his paycheck and he is injured while on the
employer's premises while so engaged. We believe that the in-
struction does have such effect, and that appellant would have
been in the course and scope of her employment at the time of
her injury if she received the instruction and was acting under
it.7
3
69. When the employer affirmatively directs the employee to take the action which
results in the employee ultimately locating himself at the place where the injury occurs,
for instance, recovery would logically follow. E.g., Crane Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 306
Ill. 56, 137 N.E. 437 (1922) (employee injured by fall on ice when returning to em-
ployer's premises to pick up his paycheck at the employer's direction entitled to re-
cover); Hackley-Phelps-Bonnell Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 165 Wis. 586, 162 N.W. 921
(1917) (logger instructed to ride to office in distant village by company logging train to
get pay entitled to compensation for injury sustained while riding on train).
70. 686 S.W.2d at 615. If the employer directs the employee that the final paycheck
will be mailed and that the employee should not return for it in person, then the em-
ployee could not reasonably believe she should return to the premises for it. Similarly,
the directive would expressly negate reliance on "plant practice" to justify a return to
the workplace or business office of the former employer. See also Rodriguez v. Sunnyside
Garden Kennels, 27 A.D.2d 967, 279 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1967). There the employer ex-
pressly directed the employee to meet him at a specific public location to discuss the
overtime pay due to the employee. The claimant was struck by an automobile while at
the designated street corner. The employer's specific directive was sufficient to link the
accident to the employment to justify compensation. In this same vein, an injury suf-
fered while the claimant travels at the direction of the employer is compensable under
Texas law. E.g., Freeman v. Texas Compensation Co., 603 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. 1980).
71. 673 S.W.2d at 696 ("[W]hether appellant was instructed by her employer to re-
turn to the bakery to collect her final pay is a disputed material issue." (emphasis in
original)).
72. 686 S.W.2d at 615-16 (Spears, J., dissenting).
73. 673 S.W.2d at 695.
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The court of appeals relied on the hearsay testimony concerning
statements made either to Bryant'4 or her husband 75 by their
foreman 76 to explain Bryant's having returned to pick up her
paycheck, and concluded that Bryant had met her burden of rais-
ing an issue of fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment for the
carrier.77 In his dissent, Justice Spears indicated he would have
applied the same rule to affirm the trial court: an employee, to
be covered under the Act, must be instructed to return to the
employer's premises to receive his pay, but he will not be covered
if he decides to pick up his paycheck based on hearsay or rumor.
Furthermore, if the employee does not request that her paycheck
be mailed to her, then it is for her convenience that she decides
to return to get it.78 The dissenters did not find that Bryant met
her burden under this formulation, 79 even in light of the deposi-
tion testimony relied on by the court of appeals.80
3. The third alternative, and that adopted by the majority of
the supreme court,"' permits recovery either upon a showing that
the employer has instructed the terminated employee to return
74. Id. The court's apparent characterization of statements made by the employer
to Bryant as hearsay was incorrect. These statements are not "hearsay" in light of TEX.
R. EVWD. 801(e)(2)(C) or (D).
75. Id. Had the statements made to Bryant's husband not been excluded as hearsay
based on application of Rule 801(e)(2)(C) or (D), Mr. Bryant's perception based on his
relation of the employer's statement to Mrs. Bryant would also have been admissible to
explain her state of mind in deciding to return to the premises to collect her final pay.
See Walters v. American State Ins. Co., 654 S.W.2d 423, 428 (Tex. 1983); Great Ameri-
can Indem. Co. v. Elledge, 159 Tex. 288, 289, 320 S.W.2d 328, 329 (1959).
76. The claimant's foreman on the job would clearly appear to be an "agent or ser-
vant" whose statement regarding the means of collecting a final paycheck would consti-
tute a statement "concerning a matter within the scope of his [foreman's] agency or
employment, made during the existence of the relationship." TEx. R. EVID.
801 (e)(2)(D).
77. 673 S.W.2d at 696.
78. 686 S.W.2d at 615-16. Justice Spearsalso preferred to characterize the relation-
ship between the terminated employee and employer still owing wages as one of debtor-
creditor. This approach was noted in the concurrence of'Judge Zimmerman in Parrott v.
Industrial Comm'n, 145 Ohio St. at 73, 60 N.E.2d at 663, who also concluded:
"Although on October 29, 1942, plaintiff's employment was at an end in the sense that
he had ceased to work under a contract for hire, it had not actually terminated until the
employer had met its contractual obligation of paying plaintiff his wages."
79. 686 S.W.2d at 615-16.
80. Id. The dissent rejected, moreover, the deposition testimony relied on by the
majority, which reflected that Bryant's decision was based on her husband's prior
experience.
81. 686 S.W.2d at 614-15.
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to work to pick up a final paycheck, 2 or upon the employee's
reasonably held belief that it is necessary to do so in order to
receive final payment for work performed. 3 As Justice Gonzalez
wrote for the majority:
We hold that when an employee is directed or reasonably be-
lieves from the circumstances she is required by the employer
to return to the place of her employment to pick up her pay
after termination and an otherwise compensable injury occurs,
then such injury is reasonably incident to her employment and
is incurred in the furtherance of the employer's affairs.8 4
Thus, an employee may recover under the Act upon this showing
of reasonable belief, even if the employer's testimony suggests
that the policy of the firm is to mail a final check. 85 This rule
appears to avoid the problem of summary judgment or directed
verdict, based solely on the testimony of the employer or his rep-
resentative, where the employee's affidavit or testimony shows
his reason for having a contrary perception of his need to return
to the employer's place of business.86
4. A final alternative which could have been adopted by the
appellate courts would have permitted recovery under the Act for
any injury sustained by a terminated employee returning to the
workplace or employer's premises after termination. This ap-
proach, arguably most favorable to the employee, might have
proved unfair in any number of instances, because it would per-
mit an employer to use the Act defensively to avoid a potentially
greater recovery from a negligence action. 7 For example, in the
82. Id. at 615.
83. Id. Reliance on the employee's reasonably held belief is illustrated by the deci-
sion in Seventh St. Rd. Tobacco Warehouse v. Stillwell, 550 S.W.2d 469 (Ky. 1976).
There, a laborer new to the job was injured upon his return to the workplace on a
Wednesday when, apparently unknown to him, his pay was not due until Saturday. Rely-
ing on the principle that the employment relationship does not terminate until the em-
ployee is paid, the court held that the injury arose within the course of employment. Id.
at 470-71.
84. 686 S.W.2d at 615.
85. In Bryant, the ambiguity regarding the employer's policy of mailing final checks,
as evidenced by the bookkeeper's affidavit, opened the door to plaintiff's reliance on her
"reasonably held belief" that she had to return to the bakery to collect her pay. Id.
86. The reasonableness of the employee's perception in such a case would likely
constitute a fact issue to be resolved by the trier of fact, roughly analogous to the issue
of good cause for failure to give notice of injury within the six month period imposed by
art. 8307, § 4a. See 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAs PATTERNJURY CHARGES PJC 24.02 and
comment (1970).
87. Recovery under the Act is limited to statutory amounts for general and specific
amounts based on either total or partial incapacity suffered as a result of the injury.
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Ellison case application of the Act to the injury sustained could
have limited or precluded recovery since the injury sustained as a
result of the assault might not have caused any period of disabil-
ity."' While the employee's negligence or intentional tort actions
against the employer and fellow employees, respectively, could
have resulted in substantial awards for minimal injuries, given
the circumstances of the assault, 9 recovery under the Act would
have been negligible in the absence of serious injury.90 More-
over, adoption of this rule would have led to continuing liability
of the employer for an indefinite period following termination of
the employee.91 On the other hand, in those cases in which the
injury claimed is suspect, or is a product of fraud on the part of a
disgruntled employee,9 2 the employer's opportunity to defend
against the claim would be compromised by his inability to rely
on common law defenses93 or to require the employee to prove
the negligence or the intentional act producing the injury.94
Tx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 8306, §§ 10, 11, Ila, and 12 (Vernon 1967). The maxi-
mum recovery available to a totally and permanently disabled employee is calculated as
the average weekly wage at the time of injury multiplied by 401 weeks. Id. § 10(b). The
average weekly wage is determined by reference to § 29.
88. In order to recover under the Act the employee must prove that he has suffered
some period of incapacity resulting from the work-related injury sustained. Abeyta v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 566 S.W.2d 708, 709-10 (rex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, writ
dism'd).
89. Punitive damages, for example, cannot be recovered under the Act unless an
employer's gross negligence contributes to the cause of the employee's death. TEx.
REv. Civ. STAT., art. 8306 § 5 (Vernon 1967); see also Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616
S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1981).
90. Absent a period of incapacity attributable to the assault, plaintiff Ellison would
have been deprived of any recovery under the Act. See supra note 88.
91. 686 S.W.2d at 616; see also Waters v. Industrial Comm'n, 349 Ill. 214, 214-15,
181 N.E. 828 (1932) (denying compensation for injury sustained by terminated em-
ployee returning to collect final pay on March 5th following termination on December
31st); Olson v. Hurlbert-Sherman Hotel, 210 A.D. 537, 207 N.Y.S. 427, 428 (1924)
(recongnizing need to limit extended period of employoient relationship following ter-
mination for purposes of employee collecting final pay).
92. The Act does recognize the right of either the claimant or carrier to seek to set
aside an award or settlement obtained by fraud, although this power is also construed as
a general grant of authority from the constitution and statutes governing the jurisdiction
of state courts. Luersen v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 550 S.W.2d 171, 173 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
93. TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 1 (Vernon 1967). For instance, the em-
ployer could not raise contributory negligence or assumption of risk as defenses. This
section does permit the employer to defend on the ground that the employee intention-
ally caused the injury himself. See also Id. art. 8309, § 1 (definition of "injury" excludes
injury intentionally self-inflicted or caused by employee intentionally).
. 94. Section 1 (a) of the Act provides that an injured employee is required to prove
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Application of the rule in future cases
The Bryant rule gives direction to trial counsel in selecting the
appropriate theory for recovery in similar cases. The employee's
perception that it is necessary to return to the employer's prem-
ises to pick up a final paycheck, or to perform some other duty
necessary to the appropriate conclusion of the employment rela-
tionship, will be sufficient to recover under the Act.95 In the ab-
sence of a reasonable basis for this perception,96 or in light of a
directive from the employer negating the reasonableness of the
inference, 97 the injured employee will have to bring a negligence
action with its attendant greater burden of proof.
The approach advocated by the dissent98 would permit em-
ployers to virtually dictate the course of the litigation by firm pol-
icy,99 and would increase the possibility of fraud by affording the
employer the opportunity to testify, after the fact, that the em-
ployee had been notified that a paycheck would be mailed, even
when no such notification had been given.100 Furthermore, even
without notification, recovery would be barred if the employee
could testify only that he assumed he should return for his final
check.10 The dissenters' approach effectively would place a bur-
den on the employee to request that the final check be mailed,
rather than require that the employer affirmatively direct that this
procedure be followed.' 0 2 If the employee never receives the
paycheck, the dissent's position apparently would not recognize
recovery under the Act for an injury sustained while attempting
negligence only if the employer is not a subscriber to worker's compensation insurance
coverage. See Holiday Hills Retirement and Nursing Center, Inc. v. Yeldell, 686 S.W.2d
770, 771 (rex. App.-Ft. Worth 1985) rev'd on other grounds, 701 S.W.2d 243 (rex.
1985).
95. 686 S.W.2d at 615.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 686 S.W.2d at 615 (Spears, J., dissenting).
99. "[I]n order for a terminated employee to be covered, that employee must have
been instructed to return to the employer's premises in order to receive her pay." Id.
100. The employer's testimony, if in conflict with that of the employee, would still
raise a fact issue as to the notification. This approach would not, consequently, facilitate
disposition of claims or summary judgment.
101. This suggests an issue raised by justice Kilgarlin at oral argument in B7yant: At
what point in time would the claimant have been justified in returning to the business to
inquire about the fact that she had not received her final paycheck through the mail?
102. It seems odd that an employee would ever be placed in the position of initiating
the procedure, as opposed to selecting from among options offered by the employer.
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to obtain the paycheck in person. This approach simply fails to
recognize the employer's duty to make certain that the termi-
nated employee is fully compensated for all work done.
The bookkeeper's affidavit in Bryant 10 3 did not affirmatively
show that the claimant was ever instructed to return to the em-
ployer's premises to pick up her check.10 4 Bryant herself did not
testify that she requested the check be mailed to her.105 Applying
the rule advocated by the dissent, she would not have been enti-
tled to recover under the Act for the injury sustained in picking
up her check, since the dissenters expressly rejected her reliance
on the hearsay. 0 6 By contrast, the majority looked at Bryant's
actions in light of the ambiguity implicit in the situation'0 7 and
found a fact issue regarding the reasonableness of her belief that
she had to return to the bakery to pick up her final paycheck.
Consequently, the reasonableness of her belief and her credibil-
ity are properly reserved for the jury.10
Bryant clearly suggests that employers can minimize their po-
tential liability for injuries sustained by terminated employees by
notifying them that final checks are routinely mailed, and by re-
quiring designation of a mailing address at the time of termina-
tion.10 9 The dissent's criticism that the majority's holding fails to
appropriately limit the duration of coverage after termination' 10
has been recognized by other courts, "I which have held that cov-
erage will nevertheless continue, but only for a reasonable period
of time." 2 Thus, an employer's actual mailing of the final
103. 673 S.W.2d at 694 (court of appeals opinion).
104. Id.
105. 673 S.W.2d at 694-95 (court of appeals opinion).
106. 686 S.W.2d at 616.
107. Id. at 615.
108. Supra note 71.
109. This conclusion is reached by applying the converse of the majority's statement:
"If plant practice required Bryant to return to pick up her pay, then her injury would
have occurred in the course and scope of employment." 686 S.W.2d at 615.
110. The dissent stated:
At some point when a former employee has not received her pay, the em-
ployee-employer relationship is transformed into a debtor-creditor relation-
ship... otherwise, a terminated employee who is not required to return, but
fails to leave a forwarding address so the check can be mailed, would return for
her paycheck six months later, fall, and be covered by worker's compensation.
686 S.W.2d at 616.
111. Supra note 91 and cases cited therein.
112. Id. See LARsoN, supra note 25, § 26.30: "It must be conceded that there is some-
thing to this argument. For an employee who came back for his pay two or three months
314 [Vol. 5:297
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paycheck appears to serve as a final act resulting in a termination
of coverage under the Act regardless of the employee's good
faith in returning the premises thereafter." 3
Litigating "course and scope" questions
Course and scope of employment questions present trial
counsel with an excellent opportunity to engage in creative lawy-
ering and to shape the development of the law. Most jury trials
in workers' compensation cases focus on two types of issues: 1)
whether an injury was sustained by an employee while in the fur-
therance of their employer's interests;' 1 4 and 2) the extent or du-
ration of disability resulting from the injury."15 The latter issue
constitutes a factual inquiry typically resolved by jury" 6 verdict,
while course and scope issues may simply involve matters of law
which arise in the context of summary judgment or directed ver-
dict practice.' 1
7
While course and scope issues are essentially legal issues, it is
important that trial counsel present a sufficient factual record.
This assures the court's awareness that an issue would be raised
by the evidence, in the event the court is inclined to apply the
construction favored by the employee-claimant. Otherwise, both
the trial and appellate courts may hold that no fact issue has been
raised, regardless of the rule applied. Counsel cannot simply rely
on a hypothetical set of facts to sustain the employee's claim
later would hardly be said to assume the employment relationship once more for the
briefjourney to the pay office."
113. Of course, if the check was never mailed, the employee might still bejustified in
returning to the business to seek an explanation for the employer's apparent failure to
make the final payment of wages.
114. See Sullivan, supra note 11.
115. E.g., Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Aguirre, 690 S.W.2d 672, 676-
77 (Tex. App.-Waco 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (extension of specific hand injury to gen-
eral injury to the body); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Rivera, 690 S.W.2d 632 (rex.
App.-Austin 1985, writ granted) (holding that employee may not recover for the com-
bined effect of general and specific injuries); Sonnier v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 417
S.W.2d 433, 435 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston 1967, no writ) (extent and duration of disa-
bility are jury questions).
116. De los Angelos Garay v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 700 S.W.2d 657, 659 (rex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).
117. Vernon v. City of Dallas, 638 S.W.2d 5 (rex. App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (summary judgment on course and scope of employment proper where no mate-
rial fact issue is in dispute); Lindley v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 437 S.W.2d 371 (rex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1969, no writ) (disputed issue as to material fact precluded summary
judgment on course and scope of employment).
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since, technically, the record will not support reversal of an in-
correct decision at trial in the absence of a disputed fact issue."',
In Bryant the court of appeals observed, for example, that the
controverting affidavits filed by plaintiff's counsel in response to
the summary judgment were not timely.119 Because the order
granting summary judgment did not expressly demonstrate that
the trial court granted leave for their late filing 20 and that they
were considered, the affidavits were of no utility on appeal in ar-
guing that an issue of fact had been raised. 21 Fortunately for
Bryant, her deposition provided the needed factual basis for her
claim.
Since a substantial body of case law exists on course and
scope issues, it is likely that most individual claims fit fairly
closely within the parameters of favorable decisions. Where con-
trolling decisions may be distinguished factually, however, the
precise wording of the employee's affidavit, his testimony on
deposition, or any other evidence, may prove critical to surviving
a summary judgment motion. However, in the absence of con-
trolling case law, Bryant suggests that reliance on decisions from
other jurisdictions may prove significant in affording the appel-
late courts some basis for decision.122 These decisions, even if
factually dissimilar, 23 may nevertheless reflect general trends in
the evolution of the law which support favorable disposition for
the plaintiff employee.
Finally, counsel should recognize the tendency for issues and
118. See Deatherage v. International Ins. Co., 615 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. 1981), where the
court held the evidence insufficient to support a finding that the employee's death was
work-related, even though in similar circumstances the law recognizes a presumption in
favor of the employee injured in a caretaker job when evidence as to the exact origin of
the cause of injury is unavailable; Sullivan, supra note 11.
119. 673 S.W.2d at 694 (relying on Lee v. McCormick, 647 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1983, no writ) (untimely response to summary judgment motion not
considered by appellate court unless the trial court granted leave for late filing or con-
sidered same in ruling on the motion)).
120. 673 S.W.2d at 694. The supreme court also noted the late filing, holding that it
had to "presume that the trial court did not consider it in rendering a take nothing
judgment in favor of INA." 686 S.W.2d at 615.
121. 673 S.W.2d at 694.
122. The supreme court majority cited the Minnesota decision in Johnson v. Toro
Co., 331 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 1983) and the Oklahoma decision in Solo Cup Co. v. Pate,
528 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1974). 686 S.W.2d at 615.
123. Johnson and Solo Cup were distinguished by Justice Spears in his dissent, 686
S.W.2d at 616, but apparently insufficiently so to persuade the majority.
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emphasis to shift during the course of litigation. The Bryant case
illustrates how a relatively simple case can generate novel issues
in both substantive and procedural law: although counsel may
present what is essentially a legal argument to the trial court in
moving for summary judgment, the ultimate disposition of the
case may be decided on the basis of factual issues raised by depo-
sition testimony. While Bryant resulted in a definitive and worka-
ble rule on the course and scope of employment issue, of greater
significance for the conduct of litigation is the problem of hear-
say as summary judgment evidence. Clearly the court of appeals'
opinion in Bryant points to this problem as an area of potential
concern for future litigants and indicates the need for trial coun-
sel to protect the client's interest in similar situations.

